Abstract-Cloud infrastructure presents new paradigms in efficiency and economy, but also bring along a new threat surface for cyber defenders to contend with. Each unique cloud computing model varies the characteristics of the cloud platform when compared to the traditional on-premise computing network. Characteristics such as shared security responsibility between the cloud provider and tenant, reduced levels of cyber visibility and response capability, on-demand computing resources, cloud-based and more complex identity and access management, and various other characteristics impact the results of applying a threat model to the cloud computing platform. Thus, the threat modeling of cloud platforms must consider a new model of shared responsibility. The threat model should recognize an approach that requires the end user to explicitly trust the cloud service provider in their respective areas of responsibility, and must consider new or modified threats. Organizations migrating their computer network from a more traditional on-premise system to cloud-based services must consider the classes of threats that any computer network faces, but also the impacts resulting from cloud unique characteristics. In this paper, we select and apply a threat model to a cloud platform. Specific cloud unique characteristics are identified, and discussions on their impact to the threat model results are described.
INTRODUCTION
The ongoing trend in government, defense, and industry is one that sees the migration of enterprise services to cloudspace. In enterprise networks, visibility into the information system is granted through touch-points owned and operated by the organization and their network defenders. As a tried-andtrue paradigm, this approach may produce vast swaths of host/network data, coupled with trending and threat feeds, to provide granular visibility and context about the state of the network, its users, and extant maliciousness. With cloud computing, the underlying infrastructure is removed from the lens, leading to blind spots for which the user or responder may have no visibility of breaches [1] [2] . This addition of cloud devices/ architecture into a network, adds a new threat surface and increases the amount of information and data to monitor for maliciousness.
We opine that security systems meant to protect infrastructure and data should be specified based on threat profiles. By quantifying threat and risk, we can show how attacks are ranked (via analysis/visualization), and what/how defenses protect the system or increase the work-factor for an adversary.
So, as organizations migrate either all or a part of their computing applications to the public cloud, they face different and additional security challenges when compared to their onpremise computing network system. Additional threats the organization faces when migrating to the cloud can be discovered by applying a threat model to the cloud computing environment.
In Section II, we discuss the differences in cloud computing versus on-premises computing, with regard to the nuances that prohibit traditional enterprise security from being adequately used on a cloud platform. In Section III, we build the discussion points from Section II to define a threat model for the cloud. We then conclude the paper in Section IV.
II. CLOUD COMPUTING VS. ON-PREMISE COMPUTING
In this section we discuss key cloud computing characteristics that differentiate cloud computing from traditional on-premise computer networks. This group of cloud characteristics is not exhaustive; however, their generality is sufficient to encompass many other security concerns for cloud computing-all of which should be considered when applying a threat model.
A. Shared Responsibility Model for Cloud Security
A public cloud is comprised of similar computing resources that an on-premises data center is comprised of, including computing hardware (e.g., processors and storage), operating systems, and software, all of which have vulnerabilities. With the cloud location being remote, the tenant cannot be expected to handle all security roles and responsibilities. Additionally, the cloud compute resources are shared among multiple tenants. Thus the cloud service provider (CSP) must provide security of the compute resources, and also must secure the software components shared among different tenants. The CSP must secure cloud tenant data from an attacker, but also protect data from being exposed to other users and tenants. Depending on the cloud model used, the CSP security responsibility may include more layers of the software stack. Data and identify protection and, in cases, application software are the responsibility of the tenant. Thus in cloud computing, Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. responsibility for mitigating the risks that result from vulnerabilities in cloud computing is shared between the CSP and the tenant [3] . This arrangement is called the shared responsibility model of cloud security.
How does the shared responsibility model for cloud security impact the application of the STRIDE-LM threat model? This approach impacts threats primarily in the way mitigation approaches are applied, and the monitoring and logging of security events and information. Under this model, the CSP has varying degrees of security responsibility depending on the cloud service model. Thus mitigation approach and monitoring/logging indicators of compromise may be the responsibility of either the CSP or the tenant.
B. Cloud Computing Offers Less Visibility and Control
When comparing visibility and control between an onpremises computing network and a cloud-based computing, the tenant loses some visibility and control over resources and data transport. The degree of loss in visibility and management is based on the cloud service model. The basic cloud service models are:
• Software as a Service (SaaS)-Tenant does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS)-Tenant does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed application.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)-Tenant does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications, and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).
This limitation in cloud computing falls under the same limitations to threat mitigation, monitoring, and logging as the shared security responsibility model. Depending on the cloud service model, the tenants will be impacted to some degree on their ability to perform monitoring and logging for security purposes. In the case of IaaS, which provides the cloud the greatest amount of control and visibility of resources, the tenant does not have capability to fully perform network-based monitoring and logging. For any of the above cloud service models, the tenant will not have access to network-based monitoring and logging, which is available for on-premises systems.
Applying the threat model to each of these cloud computing models, one discovers that the common tenant responsibility in managing threats is identity and access management (IAM). A cloud-based approach to IAM is typically complex, with the use of role-based access controls that enable granular control over users, what resources users can access, and what functions users can perform on those resources.
C. Application Programming Interfaces (API)
Call Challenges Application programming interfaces (APIs) are provided by CSPs to manage and interact with (i.e., enable, create, retrieve, update, or delete access) the cloud service's resources. These APIs are also used to retrieve data from the CSP. Cloud applications, including third-party applications, are increasingly reliant on network-connected APIs to pass work within and among cloud application components. As an example, cloud applications access storage directly via an API. When onpremise applications interact with cloud infrastructure resources, it is often through API calls. APIs used in interactions with cloud resources must include secure authorization.
As with any software, an API may have vulnerabilities. Errors in web application or API coding can lead to a cloud API vulnerability [4] . Every API represents both a feature and a potential security problem. Cloud APIs introduce three security risks:
• Unauthorized changes (integrity),
• Information leakage (confidentiality), and
• Interference with legitimate activity (denial of service).
Security risks associated with public cloud APIs are further increased because these APIs are typically accessible from the Internet.
Applying the threat model results in identification of additional cloud-based threats, such as unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data (e.g., API keys) that may then be used to alter or access cloud data.
D. On-Demand Self Service Simplifies Unauthorized Use
Cloud computing typically follows the on-demand computing delivery model. With this approach, computing resources are made available to the user as needed, while the CSP has mechanisms in place that make this process very easy and streamlined. This on-demand capability is a feature in cloud usage; however, it does have drawbacks if not done securely. Unless prohibited, users can provision and de-provision cloud resources without the consent and guidance of an organization's IT decisionmakers. Without guidance on how additional cloud resources should be provisioned, these resources may not be secured correctly, and are subject to abuse.
Monitoring and logging is difficult on cloud compute resources that are provisioned and de-provisioned at the users' will. The potential for unauthorized use, missed monitoring and logging, and/or other misuse of organization cloud resources becomes an increased risk. As an example, "shadow IT" becomes more challenging to identify and mitigate. Thus many threats identified using the threat model are further increased by this cloud feature.
E. Multi-tenancy increases the attack surface
CSPs offer various applications or functions as SaaS or PaaS. These applications or functions typically run in a multitenancy environment; meaning multiple tenants may be sharing the same cloud compute platform expecting that the CSP maintains data segregation. If the cloud software and other components were not developed with a strong emphasis on security, there may be vulnerabilities that could lead to compromised tenant data.
The recent discovery of the Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities create additional threats that can lead to compromise of the integrity and confidentiality of tenant data [5] . These vulnerabilities can lead to a breakdown of the logical isolation between applications running in a multi-tenancy compute environment. This is known as a side-channel attack [6] .
Thus the cloud computing service model introduces potential vulnerabilities that could lead to compromised data, and these should be considered when applying the STRIDE-LM threat model.
F. Secure Data Transmission to/from Cloud
In addition to the shared responsibility model for cloud security and differences in securing an organization's data in the cloud, the organization must consider securing data in transit to and from the cloud, along with data storage in the cloud. Cloud computing introduces new threats since data is no longer maintained on the organization's on-premise system, but is instead transmitted over the Internet to the CSP.
Securing data with cryptographic techniques involves both the CSP and the cloud tenant. The threat model should assess the threats considering the two-party involvement in cryptographic key material management.
G. Secure Data Storage and Data Loss in Cloud
Data stored in the cloud can be susceptible to compromise. Most CSPs offer forms of data encryption while data is at rest in cloud storage.
Data loss in the cloud can also occur as a result of mistakes by the CSP. Because the CSP manages and controls data storage, accidental deletion or an event impacting the cloud infrastructure can potentially lead to permanent loss of tenant data. This threat should be considered when using cloud services, and tenants should understand the CSP's data backup and disaster recovery plans.
H. Key Management for Cloud Cryptography
The management of cryptographic keys is further complicated when using cloud computing. When using cryptography to secure data either being sent to or stored in the cloud, an effective management approach is necessary. Keys, now managed by two entities, must be jointly secured. As with any key management approach, potential vulnerabilities may be introduced, but this is compounded with a joint cloud-based management approach.
When the threat model is applied, it must consider the impacts of two-party possession of key material.
I. Identity and Access Management
Identity and access management for cloud resources is a critical function for any organization. Cloud computing brings its form of identity and access management (IAM). Cloud IAM provides a consistent access control interface for all cloud platform resources. As an example, prior to cloud IAM, computing resource access was managed by granting owner, editor, and/or viewer permissions to users. With cloud IAM, Pub/Sub access enables publisher and subscriber roles in addition to the owner, editor, and viewer roles. Additionally, many CSPs offer role-based access control (RBAC) to help organizations manage who has access to cloud resources [7] . RBAC can also be used to manage what users can do with those resources, and what data a user has access to.
IAM plays a central role in securing access to public cloud resources, and provides a mechanism to enable or disable users access to specific resources or resource classes. IAM with RBAC enables organizations to implement security best practices and eliminates the need for high-risk behaviors such as sharing credentials. IAM and RBAC enable best practices such as least privilege by granting unique credentials to each specific user, and only granting permission to access the set of cloud resources necessary for the users to achieve their job.
III. DEFINING CLOUD THREATS
Given the cyber security differences between cloud and onpremises computing, we now delve into focusing on those differences to produce a cloud threat model. Analysis of information system security implementations must consider the threats the system may be subjected to. Threats utilize vulnerabilities in the system to exploit system resources or data. System developers deploy security mechanisms to mitigate vulnerabilities, and thus to reduce or eliminate exposure to a specific threat or class of threats. Applying a threat-driven approach to cyber security of public clouds is effective in understanding what threats can be mitigated and which remain. One such approach used in this research is called STRIDE-LM [8] . STRIDE-LM is a threat model used to categorize the objective of attacks. The model is applied at the system level, and stands for: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege, and Lateral Movement (see Table 1 below). The public infrastructure deployment is subject to many of the same threats that an on-premise data computing network is subject to. Thus, applying the STRIDE-LM threat model reveals threats that are common to both on-premise and cloud shared-service models. However, the use of public cloud computing resources adds additional, unique threats to the customer organization due to characteristics such as lack of control, little or no visibility into operations, and immature compliance requirements.
Numerous research papers describe in detail the various threats that on-premise computing may be subject to [9] [10][11] [12] . The research described in this paper focuses on threats that are introduced by public cloud computing approaches or by aspects associated with the data owner not owning the computing infrastructure. Both aspects lead to a significant change in the computing paradigm organizations have become accustomed. Table 1 lists a number of threats that should be considered when using a public cloud. In using the model, we consider how each STRIDE-LM threat can impact parts and functions of cloud computing. (Threats are categorized using the STRIDE-LM model.)
Table 1: STRIDE-LM Categorizations for Cloud Services

Spoofing:
Threat: Unauthorized Identity and Access Management (IAM) change -the change may provide escalation of privilege for a malicious user or enable an unauthorized escalation to admin for a malicious user. Example mitigation: Securing and monitoring user account credentials and access to cloud IAM resources. Threat: Unauthorized changes to admin roles and access rights that provides increased privileges for malicious purposes. This threat may also include changes to how admin activities are logged to hide malicious activity.
Example mitigation: Monitoring your admin activities provides critical insight into who is changing your Cloud environment and how it is changed. Also, monitor all admin activities with the administrative audit log.
Threat: User and admin access compromise from compromised user credentials (e.g., brute force login attempts). Example mitigation: Monitor user login activities to look for signs of compromised user credentials. Threat: Users attempting to log into the cloud environment from non-jump hosts are not authorized. Example mitigation: Cloud Security teams use jump host logins to limit and control the number of ingress points into cloud environment. Limit access into cloud only through jump host.
Tampering with data: Threat: Unauthorized disabling cloud logging services or unauthorized deleting or overwriting cloud logging data.
Example mitigation: Protect logging data. Threat: Tampering with or modifying data collected and used for Incident Response (IR). Example mitigation: Audit actions on noting personnel who dismiss alerts, when the alert was dismissed, and what annotations are made.
Repudiation:
Threat: Unauthorized user claims to have not accessed account. Example mitigation: Cloud monitoring and logging.
Information disclosure:
Threat: Unauthorized file transfers to/from production from/to cloud environments. Example mitigation: Use strong encryption on your stored data and secure communication links with protocols that provide message encryption. Also configuring firewalls for your virtual private network that control incoming and outgoing traffic with security groups and ACLs. Cloud infrastructure may introduce additional threats beyond STRIDE-LM that must be considered for any organization interested in securing their data. Such threats include:
• Consumer privacy reduction,
• Attacks against medical devices,
• Unauthorized use of resource (e.g., CPU time) to perform unauthorized tasks,
• Compromised virtual machines/devices used to launch brute force attacks against other machines, generate spam, or scan open ports and other devices on the Internet,
• Public infrastructure issues resulting in physical intrusion into a datacenter hosting properties/facilities which results in theft of unencrypted customer data,
• Service provider lock-in and data/service portability,
• Unauthorized billing configuration changes,
• Potential vulnerabilities (i.e., bugs) in CSP code/resources, which may result in malicious alteration or exposure of customer data,
• Potential deficiencies in virtualization security (improper implementation of isolation techniques, leading to inter-device/VM attacks across tenants),
• Proper and timely patching of host OS, software libraries (e.g., OpenSSL), environments (e.g., Java, Apache), or applications used in the cloud environment,
• Ransomware, hacktivism, nation-state attacks on critical infrastructure devices.
In general, a cloud computing environment is made up of the same or similar computing resources as a traditional data center. In a similar fashion, the cloud computing environment suffers from similar threats and is of interest to attackers for similar reasons as a traditional data center. But when applying the threat model to a cloud environment, some key characteristic differences distinguish the cloud environment from the traditional data center. These key differences result in additional threats organizations must consider when moving to the cloud. Applying the threat model to cloud takes into account the benefits obtained from the more granular access control, and thus reductions to the threat space.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the application of a threat model to cloud computing. This is a key step for any organization considering moving all or any of their computing applications to the cloud. The authors also identify and describe characteristics of cloud computing that are significantly different than those of traditional on-premise computing applications. These characteristic areas in the cloud introduce vulnerabilities and threats that may not have an on-premise counterpart, and thus should be assessed to avoid exploitation of cloud computing resources. The organization's security team should apply the threat model and identify and apply mitigation approaches. Additionally, the model can be used to help identify monitoring, logging, and alerting requirements. Future work includes applying the model and developing a monitoring and logging architecture that can be deployed in a cloud computing environment.
